realization that Turks were the only really loyal element among the Empire's population, and that, in the long run, Ottomanism and Islamism would not be able to hold the state together. Furthermore, there was a real fear among the same group of Turks that, with Ottomanism and Islamism carried to their logical limits, a situation might develop where, even if the Empire were to survive, they themselves, through the equality granted to others, might lose their traditional hegemonical place in the state. Whether through loss of state, or loss of status within the state, the two possibilities posed a real threat to the power of the Turkish ruling elite.
Whatever the case, expressions of Turkish national sentiment among the Turkish educated elite became more and more evident as time went on. They were reflected in the abundance of new writings on the history of the Turks, on the Turkish world at large, on aspects of Turkish culture, and particularly on language. It would seem that by the turn of the century most educated Turks had come to identify themselves as ethnically (or 'racially') Turkish, and a statement by a writer in the daily Ikdam appears to be typical of this new selfview: 'By our social order', he wrote, 'we are Ottoman, by our religion Muslims, and by our ethnic nationality (kavmiyet) we are Turks.'3 To the traditional forms of identification, Ottoman and Muslim, a third was now proudly added, that of 'Turk', which had previously possessed derogatory connotations. Still, there was no mention of political Turkism. It was impossible to adopt political Turkism as long as Ottomanism and Islamism were the official doctrines designed to uphold the state, and as long as large communities of non-Muslims and non-Turkish Muslims continued to live in the Empire. Nationalism was expressed mostly in cultural terms -the need to preserve the cultural identity of the Turks within the Ottoman state. It was also only under such terms that it was allowed to be expressed in the heavily censored Hamidian press. The Young Turk period may be viewed as the one which accelerated the process of 'conversion' to Turkism and prepared the ground for Kemalism. The factors at work further drove the Turks in the direction of Turkism -the territorial losses which showed that the collapse of the Empire was imminent, the spread of nationalism among the Arabs (the last major group of non-Turks remaining in the Empire) and, again, the fear that, should Arabs and others remain in the Empire, Turks might completely lose their dominant position in it. The relative freedom of discussion during this period made it easier to express Turkist ideas, and certain journals and associations propagating Turkism appeared. It was during this period that Ziya Gokalp, a poet and sociologist, was able to establish something like a Turkish nationalist doctrine, based on sociological and philosophical foundations.4 Still devoid of political connotations -at least until the Empire finally collapsed at the end of the first world war -it professed the discovery, promotion and spread of Turkish culture, the reform of the Turkish language, and the social and economic well-being of the nation. Into his nationalist ideology Gokalp attempted to incorporate two important elements taken from two of the main streams of thought prevalent during his time. One was Islam, which he saw as part and parcel of Turkish culture, an element of Turkish identity, and a link with the Muslim peoples, but without its political and social impact; the second was westernism, which for him was a license to borrow freely from the west elements of civilization like science and technology, though not of culture.
The period of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, following the final dissolution of the Empire, ultimately enabled Turkism to become a political doctrine. The Kemalists did not produce an ideology in the strict sense, but their statements and actions did point to some definite directions.S The basis of the new republic was to be found in loyalty both to the homeland Anatolia and to the Turkish nation which inhabited it. All citizens of the Turkish state were deemed constitutionally Turks, and this was the broader, political meaning applied to the term 'Turk'. Remaining legal barriers between the different communities were eliminated and great efforts were made to instil a sense of patriotism in all members of the population. However, it was understood, and often stated or implied, that there also existed a Turkish nation in the ethnic sense with a history, language and culture all its own. All were to be properly studied and disseminated as the particular heritage of the Turks. In this sense only 'real' Muslim Turks -Kurds were also included -were considered part of this Turkish millet, while the non-Muslim communities, like the Greeks, Armenians and Jews, were not. Islam was stripped of its political and social functions and no longer served as the official religion of the state, although it remained in effect an important criterion for affiliation to the nation, as demonstrated in the case of the Kurds. Along with nationalism, modernization (termed by the Kemalists 'reformism' or 'revolutionism') also became an important part of the Kemalist doctrine. It defined Turkey's goal as the attainment of the level of contemporary civilization, which for Ataturk and his associates meant western civilization. For them the distinction made by Gokalp between culture and civilization was far less rigid and they were prepared to borrow from the west certain cultural features as well. The proud member of the Turkish nation was to be both a (secular) nationalist and a western, as was to be Turkish society as a whole. These notions were among the most important principles of the Kemalist heritage bequeathed to future generations and they remain the standards to be followed by contemporary educated Turks. More than half a century after the death of Ataturk, it is of some use to examine the present state of Kemalist notions of national identity which, like other Kemalist principles, have undergone their own adjustments. Questions relating to national identity and self-perception in Turkey have not disappeared but, on the contrary, remained very much on the Turkish agenda to this very day. They are discussed in speeches and lectures, they are a constant motif in articles and commentaries in the media, and they are likewise the subject of several recent books.6 These questions stem, in part, from the fact that Turkish society has not yet found its homogeneity, or stability, and is split into many sub-groups with conflicting aspirations. Similarly, the state as a whole has not found its proper place in the family of nations. Everyday problems and crises on both the internal and external level thus tend to bring to the fore time and again these tormenting questions of identity. In the pages which follow, an attempt will be made to bring out the main features characterizing self-perceptions among what may be called 'mainstream' educated Turks. These will rely on the statements and pronouncements of leaders and public figures from the political parties of the centre (centre right or centre left). These are the parties which by and large have commanded the support of the vast majority of the Turkish population and have been responsible for running the affairs of the country throughout the post-Kemalist period. The ideas expressed by these public figures have, of course, not only reflected the views of their constituencies, but have also had a great impact on shaping them. Discussion will concentrate on four main issues which have tended to be at the centre of public debate: minority versus nation; the attitude towards the 'outside Turks', living beyond the borders of Turkey; the place of Islam; and affiliation with the west.
The question of minorities has negatively affected Turkish political stability for many years and has also inflicted much damage on Turkish international relations.7 Although the Armenians can no longer be said to constitute a strong minority in Turkey, amounting to no more than several tens of thousands, Armenians of the diaspora have been active in carrying out an anti-Turkish political campaign, and at one time some militant groups among them (notably ASALA) went as far as resorting to terrorism and assassinating Turkish public figures, particularly diplomats. More problematic, however, has been the Kurdish minority, whose numbers are estimated at six to twelve million, largely concentrated in the south-eastern regions of the country. Clandestine Kurdish organizations, and particularly the Kurdish Workers' Party known as the PKK, in recent years have been carrying out a bloody guerrilla war against Turkish authorities, resulting in thousands of casualties. There was, in addition, particularly in the late 1970s but also as recently as 1995, serious unrest between members of the Sunni majority and members of the strong Alevi community, estimated at times at up to 20 per cent of the Turkish population. In the face of all these destabilizing events, Turkey has had to resort to some harsh military and political measures. At the same time, however, and faced with what amounted to ominous signs of social disintegration, she has been forced to give answers to some of the very basic political and ideological questions relating to the place accorded by Turkish society to national or religious minorities. In this context, the Turks have inevitably found themselves compelled to touch upon the very foundations of their political community as elaborated by Mustafa Kemal, and define, or redefine, the exact relationships which should exist between Muslim and non-Muslim, Turk and non-Turk, or Turk of one Muslim sect and another. The task was made necessary by the need to address at one and the same time the Turkish public itself, the minorities in question, and the outside world, ever critical of Turkey's handling of her minority problem.
The response, to be sure, has been different in each case. As for the Armenians, Turks would habitually deny Armenian accusations, bring some of their own, and point to the historically good relations which, according to them, had existed in the past, and still exist today, between Turks and Armenian citizens of Turkey. There has been little inhibition in referring to the Armenians by name because, although citizens of the state and not referred to as a national minority as such, they are seen as differing both ethnically and religiously from the main body of the Turkish population. Moreover, the 1923 Lausanne Treaty of Peace specifically refers to the rights of the non-Muslim minorities, including the Armenians, and the Turks have been fairly strict in their observance of these rights. Due to the small number of Armenians in Turkey, Turks had also little to fear by allowing more tolerance toward the separate existence of the Armenian minority (or, for that matter, other nonMuslim communities).
With the Kurds and other Muslim minorities, matters are different. Their separate existence was not recognized during the Kemalist period and they were considered part of the Turkish nation in the ethnic or racial sense. To date, no recognition of the Kurds as a national minority has been forthcoming and Turkish spokesmen still regard Turks and Kurds as part and parcel of the same nation. According to them, Kurds have always been in partnership with Turks, have enjoyed equal rights in the state, and consequently there has not been any real Kurdish problem. The Kurdish uprising is seen as the expression of economic and social discontent, the action of a small terrorist group, the outcome of subversion from the outside, or all of these combined. The solution, therefore, is to be found in suppressing the rebels, accelerating economic and social development, and consolidating democracy in the country as a whole. What has emerged in recent times, however, no doubt not only because of the bitter struggle against the Kurdish rebels but also because of international pressure, is a significantly greater readiness to give legitimacy to the term 'Kurd' and to recognize their existence if not as a 'national' group, then as an 'ethnic' one. Turkish political leaders are still adamant in their refusal to grant cultural, let alone administrative or political autonomy to the Kurds, but some relaxation in the attitude of official Turkey toward limited Kurdish self-expression has, in fact, occurred and is reflected in the use of Kurdish in publications, the performance of Kurdish music and songs, and the celebration of the traditional Kurdish festival of nevruz (New Year). Addressing the Sunni-Alevi question, Turkish leaders, in a similar vein, have seen it as an 'artificial' problem, largely fanned by outside forces, and have stressed the insignificance of the religious divisions, the essential partnership between the groups, and the need for unity, as prescribed by the common Islamic religion itself. But the distinction between the sects -never recognized officially -has been given licence in recent years, and has been openly discussed.
These These and other difficulties have led to interesting reactions in Turkey. They have no doubt helped to some extent to nourish the reorientation toward the Muslim world which has already been noted. One other kind of reaction has been the attempt to stress Turkey's unique position as a bridge -a bridge between east and west, between Europe and Asia, and between the Christian world and the Muslim world. This motif has been extensively used by Turkey to promote her international relations or simply explain her 'multifaceted' foreign policy. It has often been necessary, for example, to explain to the west Turkey's Islamic orientation, and to the Muslim nations the state's alliance with the west. But the bridge motif has also,been offered as an answer to Turkey's identity problem in general. This is well reflected in the words of Mumtaz Soysal, a former foreign minister: This is the most opportune time to rid ourselves of the complex of being considered Europeans. This complex has agitated our heads again now that Greece has entered the EEC. We are Turks from Turkey. Turkey is a country with one bank in Europe and the other in Asia. The same thing can be said of our geography and culture. We must realize and accept this as such and we must turn this embarrassment into a sense of superiority.2' For most educated Turks, it must be added, the European section of this 'bridge' which is called Turkey seems more deeply grounded in the west than the east. Turkish public figures of the mainstream have been united in the view that Turkey is European and western and this cannot simply be attributed to political expediency, expecting western political or economic support. For the Turks, belonging to Europe or the west is really belonging to the civilized world and it is the legacy of Kemal Ataturk. Perhaps this civilized world does not want Turkey, but as one Turkish commentator put it, Turkey was trying to stick to Europe despite Europe's dislike of her.22 The experience has been most painful for the Turks because, in a sense, the rejection they feel on the part of western nations is perceived as the rejection of one member of a family by the other members.
Little doubt remains that Turkey, in many ways, has had to depart from a strict observance of the guiding principles of the Kemalist period and the kind of self-perception and views it aimed to instil in the population. Perhaps a unified homogeneous nation was Ataturk's ideal, but Turkish society has proved to be divided across many lines and is increasingly recognized as ethnically heterogeneous; a strong orientation toward the larger Turkic world has once again come to the fore and runs somewhat counter to the previous emphasis on the homeland Anatolia; secular Turkey, where reference to Islam as the official religion was dropped from the constitution, is now recognized as a Muslim society and state; and there have been problems with becoming part of the western world and western civilization.
In a sense, it is possible to view the changes as signs of a withdrawal of Turkey into her old self. Clearly, Turkey, experimenting with new policies and orientations, has had not only to encounter the difficulty of parting with her own traditions but also to surmount the realities of her situation and some very practical obstacles along the way. It has not been easy to accept the kind of loyalties prescribed by 'patriotic' and secular nationalism, nor has it been easy to find the way for integration with the west and western civilization. Instead, some more conservative notions, religious or 'tribal', have proved their strength and worth. Turkey, as seen from her recent history, has had to waver between the appeal of all of them as circumstances have led her to shift her emphasis from one to another. In the process, contradictions were inevitable. These were not all matters of internal or external policies alone, but matters of identity as well, and, as such, they have resulted in much soulsearching and torment for both individuals and society as a whole. 
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